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bstract
n this article, we review literature on socioemotional wealth. We explain how the concept of socioemotional wealth builds on previous family
rm research showing that family-owners derive utility from the nonfinancial aspects of their firm. We also discuss how family firms’ need for
ocioemotional wealth preservation explains behavioral differences between family and nonfamily firms in managerial decision making. Finally,
e discuss the current state of socioemotional wealth research and propose potential directions for future research.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Research shows that family-owned firms make decisions
nlike those of nonfamily firms (Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone,
 De Castro, 2011). Extending previous research, Gómez-
ejía, Haynes, Nún˜ez-Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes
2007) explain those dissimilarities by proposing that family-
wners’ seek utility in the form of preserving socioemotional
ealth generated by the noneconomic aspects of family busi-
esses.
Family-owners derive socioemotional wealth from several
ources, including having the family name associated with their
rms, emotional attachment to the firm, and the satisfaction
f family members working for the company (Gómez-Mejía
t al., 2011). However, since one task of a family firm is to
ustain and increase owners’ socioemotional wealth, its preser-
ation affects the business decision-making of family-owners
nd the firm’s managers. In other words, decisions that seem
nprofessional to outside observers, such as appointing an unex-
erienced family member as the CEO of the firm, might be
ogical to family-owners because they provide nonfinancial ben-
fits. Hence, family’s desire to preserve socioemotional wealth
ffects family firms’ long-term performance both positively and
egatively. The effects might negate each other as research yields
ixed results regarding how family ownership affects firm per-
ormance (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). This study explains and
rovides examples of socioemotional wealth and encourages
uture research to investigate processes that mediate how family-
wners’ desire to preserve socioemotional wealth affects their
rms.
istrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ocioemotional  wealth
Empirical research consistently shows that family and non-
amily firms behave differently in significant ways (Berrone,
ruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011).
uilding on previous research on family firms, Gómez-Mejía
t al. (2007) propose the concept of socioemotional wealth to
xplain those differences in behaviors of family and nonfamily
rms. Socioemotional wealth, they explain, encompasses “the
tilities family-owners derive from the noneconomic aspects of
he business” (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
Family-owners derive socioemotional wealth from several
ources. For instance, they feel connected with the family firm;
ence, forming an emotional bond with the firm (Kets de Vries,
996; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). This emotional bond between the
amily and the firm affects how the family-owners manage the
rm (Baron, 2008). Members of the owning family often identify
ith their firm, especially if it bears the family name, and value
heir firm’s public image because it reflects on the family (Dyer
 Whetten, 2006). In other words, a positive public image of
he firm enhances the socioemotional wealth derived from the
rm.
Family-owners also rely on the firm to diffuse the family’s
alues among employees and throughout society (Gómez-Mejía
t al., 2011). Over time, these values permeate the organiza-
ional culture of family firms. Finally, the impulse to improve
he welfare of the family unit motivates family firms strongly
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Family-owners are gratified that
amily members work for the firm. For instance, the founder
ratified by providing an opportunity for her children to work
or the family firm.
As explained above, family-owners derive socioemotional
ealth from several sources and they are keen to sustain
heir socioemotional wealth endowment. To achieve this goal,
amilies are willing to make decisions that seem financially
nexplicable and unprofessional become logical in light of
he family’s desire to preserve socioemotional wealth. Con-
equently, executives making managerial decisions in family
rms are concerned of both financial factors and socioemotional
ealth preservation. While executives in nonfamily firms are
ainly concerned with financial factors, family firms are less
riven by prospects that are financially lucrative but threaten
ocioemotional wealth. This possibility explains why empir-
cal research finds that behaviors of family and nonfamily
rms differ. It also explains why determining whether family
rms financially outperform nonfamily firms is inconsequen-
ial. Above, we have discussed how family and nonfamily firms
iffer. Next, we will examine effects of socioemotional wealth
reservation in managerial decision making in family firms.
he  effects  of  socioemotional  wealth  preservation
The family’s need for socioemotional wealth preservation
ffects how family firms make managerial choices. In their
iscussion of socioemotional wealth preservation, Gómez-
ejía et al. (2011) classify the managerial choices of family
rms into five dimensions: management processes, strategic
a
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hoices, organizational governance, stakeholder relationships,
nd business venturing. Following their categorization, we now
xamine how family-owners’ desire to preserve socioemotional
ealth affects their strategic decision-making and organization
overnance.
trategic  decision-making
Previous research on family firms has shown major dif-
erences between family and nonfamily firms in strategic
ecision-making (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). In general, fam-
ly firms are more risk averse—and therefore, generally more
table—because the family’s wealth might be tied to their
rm, making family-owners wary of high-risk strategies that
ould diminish their wealth. However, family firms are not
lways risk averse. On the contrary, family firms are will-
ng to take large financial risks to prevent extensive loses on
heir socioemotional wealth. If the family firm is threatened,
or instance, family-owners might take risks to guarantee its
urvival and associated socioemotional wealth. That said, how-
ver, family-owners appear happier than nonfamily-owners with
ower financial returns if they preserve socioemotional wealth.
herefore, the desire to preserve socioemotional wealth might
ead to higher or lower risk-taking, depending on how outcomes
re perceived to affect socioemotional wealth.
Family firms are also less likely to diversify than nonfam-
ly firms. Diversification often means seeking financing via debt
nancing or equity participation, which dilutes family owner-
hip. Either reduces family control over the firm and diminishes
amily’s socioemotional wealth. Therefore, family firms are
ess likely to diversify. In addition, family firms might lack
he specialized knowledge or talent needed to diversify suc-
essfully, and hiring external help would increase information
symmetries, diminishing socioemotional wealth and making
iversification unappealing. These considerations also explain
hy family firms are less likely to make acquisitions and finance
perations via debt. Their reluctance is grounded in the desire
o preserve socioemotional wealth.
That desire influences strategic decisions such as choice of
ccounting practices (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Agency the-
ry suggests that family firms would aggressively avoid taxes
ecause family-owners benefit relatively more from tax avoid-
nce than other owners of the firm. However, Chen, Chen,
heng, and Shevlin (2010) show that family firms avoid taxes
ess aggressively than nonfamily firms. Their finding follows
he logic of socioemotional wealth because family-owners fear
egative outcomes associated with aggressive tax avoidance that
ay diminish family’s socioemotional wealth. Gómez-Mejía
t al. (2011) conclude that family firms apparently value their
eputation and firm image over short-term benefits of account-
ng practices that could reduce socioemotional wealth. Their
onclusion suggests that corporate family firms value corporate
itizenship.In conclusion, the desire to preserve socioemotional wealth
ffects how family firms make strategic decisions in comparison
ith nonfamily firms. To preserve socioemotional wealth, fam-
ly firms are generally less willing than nonfamily firms to take
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ig risks although they do so to preserve socioemotional wealth
f it is threatened. Next, we will discuss how socioemotional
ealth preservation affects corporate governance in family
rms.
rganizational  governance
Socioemotional wealth preservation is important for fam-
ly owners and Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011) suggest that this
ffects the governance of family firms. The literature of cor-
orate governance traditionally regards family ownership as an
xemplary mode of governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983); how-
ver, Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001) show that
his is not the whole picture. Family firms have governance prob-
ems not dissimilar to those of nonfamily firms, but their origins
iffer. Family-owners’ desire to preserve socioemotional wealth
eans that family firms might, for instance, prefer projects that
re financially less optimal or hire family members irrespec-
ive of their abilities. Again, these decisions might provide other
enefits to the family firm, such as improving its reputation or
etaining more devoted employees.
Another difference between family and nonfamily firms is the
osition of top executives. Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011) propose
hat family CEOs are less likely to be dismissed than nonfam-
ly CEOs; however, their compensation is generally lower than
hose of nonfamily-firm CEOs. That is, family firms provide
reater job security but less compensation.
Finally, the preservation of socioemotional wealth affects the
omposition of boards of directors of family firms. For example,
f investors in a publicly-traded family firm perceive it to have
overnance problems, the firm might appoint outside directors to
ignal its quality and legitimacy. To conclude, boards of family
rms serve functions absent in nonfamily firms because of the
reservation of socioemotional wealth.
We have discussed how family-owners’ desire to preserve
ocioemotional wealth affects the governance of family firms in
omparison with nonfamily firms. Both face governance issues;
owever, those issues are distinctive because the desire to pre-
erve socioemotional wealth guides decision-making in family
rms but not in nonfamily firms.
onclusion
To explain the disparate results of studies examining fam-
ly and nonfamily firms, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) proposed
hat the owners of family firms desire to preserve their socio-
motional wealth, which is the utility that family-owners derive
rom the noneconomic aspects of the firm. The authors built
n the previous research showing that family-owners value
ighly the nonfinancial benefits that they derive from the family
rm. The authors also suggested that family-owners’ need to
reserve socioemotional wealth is a major factor explain differ-
nces in behaviors of family and nonfamily firms. When making
anagerial decisions, family firms consider the preservation of
TAdministração 51 (2016) 409–411 411
ocioemotional wealth alongside financial factors. Therefore,
ecisions that may seem unprofessional might be motivated by
amily-owners’ desire to preserve their socioemotional wealth.
mpirical studies strongly support these results, and we find
t inconsequential that they do not definitively answer whether
amily firms financially outperform nonfamily firms.
To conclude, we are not suggesting that the research on
ocioemotional wealth has reached its peak; on the contrary,
he most of the current research limits its scope to examining
ow family-owners’ desire to preserve socioemotional wealth
ffects managerial choices. Therefore, it would be important
hat future research would help us to understand processes
hat mediate the relationships between family-owners’ desire
o preserve socioemotional wealth and outcome variables. For
nstance, researchers could apply the logic of socioemotional
ealth in the field of entrepreneurship to explain how family
rms become entrepreneurially orientated. Doing so suggests
hat the level of the analysis should shift from managerial-level
o employee-level. Furthermore, such research could advance
he understanding of how family and nonfamily firms differ and
hether the differences are limited to the higher levels of orga-
izations or are they also observable at the lower organizational
evels. This research would provide important implications for
ll family firm researchers.
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